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ABSTRACT
This article seeks to reconcile the support status of cyber power in the United
States military with the seriousness of the cyber threat confronting the nation. It
rejects the argument that cyber weapons are not useful and are not traditional
“weapons” by drawing parallels between cyber power and military force in the
physical domains, as well as revealing how some of the most prominent issues
in cybersecurity are political and not technological in nature. The article
proposes strategic culture as an alternative explanation for U.S. cyber power’s
current status. By studying the case studies of American air and space power,
the analysis arrives at four factors that characterize the U.S. military’s
integration of new technologies: 1) the initial use of new technologies to
provide support to the services, 2) the importance of public interest in driving or
constraining integration, 3) the effect a national crisis can have on helping the
military overcome constraints against integration, and 4) the influence of
external conflict on the military’s integration of new technologies. These
findings together constitute a model which attributes the current status of cyber
power to a history of dependence, public ignorance and lack of concern, and the
absence of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor.” Acknowledging this, a cyber attack or cyber
war against the United States has the best chance of changing the current status
of American cyber power.
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Introduction
Today, people regard “cyberspace”—a digital realm encapsulating users’ transactions on
computers and across internet and communication technologies (ICTs)—as a medium in which
everyone can invent new identities, communicate freely, and participate in a globalized world.
But cyberspace is not entirely safe. Hacking has evolved into more nuanced forms of
penetration, and terrorist networks, cyber criminals, and rogue states can now target nations’
critical infrastructures, the functions of which are dependent on computer technology.
As a result of these developments, the U.S. military has established a presence in
cyberspace. In 2006, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) defined the military’s interest in cyberspace
as emblematic of a new doctrine of warfare. Network-centric operations (NCOs), or the use of
ICTs to build a command’s “shared awareness” of the battlefield, embody the point that
computers can help generals understand a battlefield, issue orders, and confront some of the
challenges posed by modern warfare. 1 The U.S. military realizes this strategic utility of ICTs,
not to mention how attackers can use computer technology to attack the vast network of
commercial companies on which it depends for communications and logistics support. 2
Cyberspace has even evolved into an independent military domain in need of its own deterrence
mechanisms. As a result, the U.S. military has established a presence in the cyber sphere.
Three examples demonstrate the cyber threats confronting the U.S. military. The first is
an example of cyber attacks being used to disrupt civilian infrastructure, which in turn adversely
affects the military. Imagine that a type of malware is successfully used to disrupt computers

Clay Wilson, “Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,” Congressional
Research Service, published March 15, 2007, accessed March 2, 2014,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32411.pdf, 1.
2
Jason Andress and Steve Winterfeld, Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for Security Practitioners
(Waltham: Syngress, 2011), 15.
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that monitor the transferal of oil at a refinery. Those computers might not be able to process new
orders, causing oil shortages around the world. This would spell trouble for the U.S. military.
Not only would it receive less oil for its vehicles, but the “military-industrial complex” would
come to a halt when private contractors could no longer afford to transport their goods and
services. Such an attack would therefore diminish the ability of the U.S. military to project
power at home and abroad.
The second example, which goes back to the Cold War, involves cyber attacks being used
as military acts in times of war. In January 1982, a Trans-Siberian gas pipeline exploded
unexpectedly. Many reports assert the CIA caused the explosion by inserting a Trojan virus into
the software that managed the pipeline’s pressure.3 This incident demonstrates that cyber
weapons can produce “real world” effects similar to those of traditional weapons. It also
illustrates the converse: kinetic attacks are like cyber attacks in that both render something
inoperable. The justification for taking out a military target, such as an oil pipeline, is that the
target will be eliminated. Casualties and/or collateral damage are secondary effects. In this
instance, just as cyber weapons can render a pipeline inoperable by corrupting pressure sensors,
bombs can do the same by destroying the pipeline altogether.
Lastly, a cyber attack on U.S. military networks is an example of cyber weapons being
used to disrupt the military’s functionality. Given the prevalence of NCOs, a cyber attack on a
military network would actually have more far-reaching effects than a kinetic attack. Orders
might not be issued. Supplies might not arrive. The military’s leadership might receive false or
outdated information. All of these would place American soldiers in danger. In an age where

3

George Kostopoulos, Cyberspace and Cybersecurity (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2013), 117.
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information is crucial to winning a war, manipulating a combatant’s intelligence can mean the
difference between victory and defeat.
Interestingly, Stuxnet fits all three classifications. Discovered in June 2010, Stuxnet is
responsible for having damaged the centrifuges at an Iranian nuclear enrichment plant located in
Natanz.4 The attack was so devastating that it allegedly set the entire Iranian nuclear program
back by two years.5 In this sense, Stuxnet was a military attack that transcended the digitalkinetic divide and undermined Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon. Stuxnet also disrupted
the Iranian military insofar as the attack forced it to reallocate funds in an effort to resume its
nuclear program, not to mention postponed its acquisition of certain weapons which could figure
largely into all of its future operations. At the same time, however, some believe Stuxnet helped
delay the startup of Iran’s Bushehr’s nuclear power plant,6 which today is now generating
electricity for civilian use.7 As a result, Stuxnet also disrupted civilian infrastructure by delaying
the production of nuclear power for non-military consumption.
In response to the threats explained above, the American armed services have militarized
cyberspace. No action captures this better than the creation of United States Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM). The sub-unified command pursues a two-pronged mission. First, it protects,
guides, and defends the DoD’s information networks on a daily basis. 8 Second, it uses its
Mark Clayton, “How Stuxnet cyber weapon targeted Iran nuclear plant,” Christian Science Monitor, published
November 16, 2010, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/1116/How-Stuxnet-cyberweapon-targeted-Iran-nuclear-plant.
5
Peter Bright, “Stuxnet apparently as effective as military strike,” Ars Technica, published December 16, 2010,
accessed April 25, 2014, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/12/stuxnet-apparently-as-effective-as-a-militarystrike/.
6
Mark Clayton, “Stuxnet malware is ‘weapon’ out to destroy…Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant?,” Christian Science
Monitor, published September 21, 2010, accessed April 25, 2014.
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0921/Stuxnet-malware-is-weapon-out-to-destroy-Iran-s-Bushehr-nuclearplant.
7
“Iran to launch second stage of Bushehr nuclear plant,” PressTV, published March 1, 2014, accessed April 25,
2014, http://www.presstv.com/detail/2014/03/01/352797/iran-to-launch-2nd-stage-of-bushehr-plant/.
8
“US Cyber Command,” U.S. Army Cyber Command, accessed November 26, 2013,
http://www.arcyber.army.mil/org-uscc.html.
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resources to “coordinate DoD operations providing support to military missions… [as well as]
prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations.” 9 By fullspectrum cyber operations, the DoD means the full range of cyber weapons that can be used to
support military functionality and its networks’ viability. 10
Curiously, the mission of USCYBERCOM does not fully address the seriousness of the
cyber threat confronting the United States. The Department of Defense has ample financial
resources and political will, so it should respond rationally and grant cyber power more
operational autonomy, i.e. enable CYBERCOM to launch attacks both offensively and
defensively against targets in cyberspace using tactics and strategies whose formulation it
oversees with an appreciable degree of non-interference from the other services. But the DoD
has not, which begs the question: If cyber technology constitutes a real threat to the United
States, why is the U.S. military restraining cyber power to support functions only?
In this paper, I seek to answer the question, “Why does the United States military not
grant cyber power greater operational autonomy?” My conclusion is the organizational culture
of the U.S. military is responsible. I begin by explaining the conventional wisdom, which
maintains that the U.S. military restrains its use of cyber power because cyber technology is too
ambiguous for cyber weapons to be useful or even constitute “weapons” in a traditional sense.
This technologist argument understands technology as ahistorical and static and asserts that four
issues unique to cyberspace—casualties, proportionality, signaling, and attribution—preclude a
further integration of cyber power. I refute these claims by demonstrating how these problems

9

Ibid.
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Department Cyber Efforts: Definitions, Focal Point, and Methodology
Needed for DOD to Develop Full-Spectrum Cyberspace Budget Estimates, published July 29, 2011, accessed
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apply to conventional weapons already adopted by the military. I also illustrate how the nature
of many of these problems is political, not technological, in nature.
In the second section of my paper, I present my main argument. Militaries are always
adopting new technology, and this process can only be understood by going beyond the
technology in question to include changes that reflect the overall culture of the military.
Subsequently, the U.S. military’s strategic culture—its beliefs, expectations, and values that
inform how it pursues its objectives11 —is a better explanation of why the U.S. military has not
integrated U.S. cyber power further.
The notion of strategic culture carries significant implications for understanding U.S.
cyber power. It acknowledges, among other things, the importance of history with respect to
military change.12 The U.S. military has a unique history that informs its strategic actions. U.S.
cyber power is not an ahistorical variable of technology but rather a process of military change,
informed by the historical developments, behaviors, and actions of the American armed services
as an organization.
I examine U.S. military strategic culture through two case studies—U.S. air power and
space power—in the third section of my paper. These cases are important because, like cyber
power, they produced technology booms in the United States, helped constitute entirely new
warfighting domains for the U.S. military, and revolutionized modern military affairs. These
cases reveal four important commonalities: the initial support status of new technologies, the
role of popular interest in motivating (or preventing) change, organizational change following a
national crisis, and the centrality of external conflict. I end the section by synthesizing these
elements together into a model for military technological integration in the United States.

11
12

Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 34.
Ibid.
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In the fourth section, I use this model to examine U.S. integration of cyber power. I
demonstrate how each of the four components work against further integration of cyber
technology on the part of the U.S. military at this time. I then cite three developments—the
increasing variety of potential applications of cyber weapons, the unlikelihood of a cyber warfare
convention, and the decreasing costs of cyber capabilities—to illustrate a trend by which actors
have a growing incentive to launch a cyber attack against the United States. While such an
attack may never occur, it is the most likely way the U.S. military would grant American cyber
power greater operational autonomy. Finally, I conclude by showing how my model for
technological integration relates to the military’s current use of other new technologies.

The Technologist Argument
The technologist argument asserts that the U.S. military has not given more operational
autonomy to American cyber power because cyber technology is ambiguous. According to this
argument, the U.S. military uses cyber power only as means of support because cyber weapons
cannot explode and cannot kill people. If they lack kinetic force to blow up a military target and
cannot cause casualties in the process, the U.S. military has no use for these types of weapons on
the battlefield. This argument further argues that notions of “intention”, “identity”, and
“damage” are fundamentally variable in cyberspace. An actor cannot directly cause casualties,
determine proportionality of response, signal its intentions, or confidently attribute the source of
an attack, all of which one can allegedly do with conventional and nuclear weapons. As such,
these issues reveal that cyber weapons are not actually “weapons” and are not military useful.
In the following section, I argue the technologist argument is inadequate for explaining
the status of U.S. cyber power. First, I explain each of the four problems discussed above. I then
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offer a rebuttal to each explanation by drawing parallels to conventional weapons or revealing
the political and not technological nature of each problem.

CASUALTIES

Most IR scholars and U.S. military leaders cite the alleged inability to inflict casualties as a
reason why cyber power continues to be tied to the traditional services. One of the lead
proponents of this viewpoint is Thomas Rid. Rid is well-respected in the cyberwar debate.
Perhaps the greatest source of his fame has been the publication of Cyber War Will Not Take
Place, in which he questions the notion of “violence” in cyberspace.
It is important here to propose a working definition of “violence.” Willem de Haan
understands violence as “an act of physical hurt deemed legitimate by the performer and
illegitimate by (some) witnesses.”13 For an act to be violent, physical harm must be transferred
between the attacker and victim. One type of violence, “political violence,” is undertaken by a
group of individuals who share some political motivation for their actions.14 This often takes the
form of an act which threatens to change or undermine the legitimacy of a political system. 15
Political violence therefore aims to disturb certain social relations and associated ways of life.16
Rid argues that political violence in cyberspace is different than in the real world because
attackers can cause casualties only indirectly.17 Cyber attacks cannot directly cause casualties
because the act of force (the cyber attack) and the response (human death) are located in two
different media: the former in cyberspace, and the latter in the real world. Cyber operations

Willem de Haan, “Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept,” in Violence in Europe: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Sophie Body-Gendrot and Pieter Spierenburg (New York: Springer, 2008), 30.
14
Perry Mars, “The Nature of Political Violence,” Social and Economic Studies 24, no. 2 (1975): 228.
15
Ibid.
16
Brandon Hamber, Transforming Societies After Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation, and Mental Health
(New York: Springer, 2009), 22.
17
Raffaello Pantucci, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Rusi Journal 158, no. 6 (2013): 106.
13
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negate the symbolism of the human body as it relates to causing and receiving violence.18 This
means that cyber weapons are not violent, which invalidates the possibility of the U.S. military
integrating cyber power beyond its current non-violent support functions.
Notwithstanding the praise it has received, Rid’s argument is flawed chiefly because he
employs a definition of violence that, by only recognizing acts that directly cause damage to the
body, is far too narrow in today’s world. Jun Osawa notes, for instance, that the lethality of
cyber attacks rests in their ability to cause systems that monitor national critical infrastructure to
malfunction.19 By attacking electrical power grids, air traffic control towers, and/or industrial
plants, malicious actors in cyberspace can precipitate events that could result in death.20 This
may be an indirect means of causing casualties, but it is no less of a potential concern.
By dismissing the indirect lethality of cyber weapons, Rid emphasizes the method of
violence at the expense of its consequences.21 This minimalist conception of violence misreads
today’s world. Rid would benefit from analyzing violent acts with regards to their effects, both
direct and indirect.22 By accepting this framework, he and other scholars could understand how
and why the effects of one type of cyber attack can vary depending on its target.23 Additionally,
they could also see how violence can be committed against things and then passed to people,24
which reflects the dangers of a cyber attack launched against national critical infrastructure.

18

Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 15.
Jun Osawa, “Is Cyber War Around the Corner? Collective Cyber Defense in the Near Future,” Brookings,
published November 2013, accessed February 18, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/12cyber-defense-us-japan-alliance-osawa.
20
Ibid.
21
Michael Turner, “Is There Such a Thing as a Violent Act in Cyberspace?,” International Security and Intelligence
Summer School 2013, Pembroke College, and the University of Cambridge, accessed February 18, 2014,
http://www.pem.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Is-there-such-a-thing-as-violence-in-cyberspace.pdf, 1.
22
Larry Ray, Violence and Society (New York: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2011), 9.
23
Michael Turner, “Is There Such a Thing as a Violent Act in Cyberspace?,” 3.
24
“Violence,” Oxford Dictionary, accessed February 18, 2014,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/violence.
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But even beyond conceptions of violence, modern warfare as a phenomenon is shifting
away from violence more generally. Since the end of the twentieth century, violent interstate
wars conducted on discrete battlefields have been replaced by irregular warfare (IW), lowintensity conflicts that are asymmetric in nature and which may involve non-state combatants
hiding among civilian populations for protection and support.25 These operational constraints
pose serious challenges to the U.S. military. On the one hand, its mission has not changed: it
still needs to eliminate those who threaten the security of the U.S. But on the other hand, any
application of force threatens to result in significant collateral damage, which could undermine
the military’s legitimacy.26 Balancing these two objectives is no small challenge.
In response, the American armed services have done two things. First, they have started
to use “smart” weapons as a means to counter the liability posed by human soldiers. Command
and control (C2), the ability of a commanding officer/headquarters to coordinate operations in
the battlefield, is vitally important in war.27 But by relying on humans, who can die in combat or
fail to fulfill their orders, military organizations are needlessly risking the success of their
missions when they could use more dependable, more resilient machines instead.28 Warfare is
becoming too fast and complex for humans, and weapon systems are cheaper to replace than
human soldiers, anyway.29 Subsequently, the U.S. military is now casualty-averse for strategic
purposes.30 War threatens to kill too many soldiers, which translates into a decline in public

25

Richard L. Scott, Conflict Without Casualties: Non-Lethal Weapons in Irregular Warfare (Monterey: Naval
Postgraduate School, 2007), 21.
26
Ibid.
27
Carl H. Builder, Steven C. Bankes, and Richard Nordin, Command Concepts: A Theory Derived From Practice
of Command and Control (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999), xiii-xiv.
28
Thomas K. Adams, “Future Warfare and the Decline of Human Decisionmaking,” Parameters 41 (2011): 8.
29
Mark Gubrud, “US Killer Robot Policy: Full Speed Ahead,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, published
September 20, 2013, accessed February 19, 2014, http://thebulletin.org/us-killer-robot-policy-full-speed-ahead.
30
Chukwuma Osakwe, “Non-Lethal Weapons and Force-Casualty Aversion in 21st Century Warfare,” Journal of
Military and Strategic Studies 15, no. 1 (2013): 2.
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support for any war effort.31 Acknowledging this, by using autonomous weapon systems, the
U.S. military stands to use its resources more economically, protect its human soldiers, and
enhance its ability to wage war over extended periods of time.
Second, the U.S. military is now investigating the use of non-lethal weapons (NLWs).
NLWs refer to non-lethal chemical, electromagnetic, and kinetic devices that law enforcement
and military personnel can use to undermine an enemy’s aggression and/or lethality with
minimal risk of collateral damage.32 These weapons range from crowd-control instruments, such
as pepper spray canisters, deployable nets, and batons,33 to more sophisticated systems like the
Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs), which emits a high-pitched tone capable of producing
hearing loss at up to 500 yards away.34
The U.S. military clearly has a number of potential NLWs at its disposal, not the least of
which is cyber weapons. With the creation of USCYBERCOM, Air Force Major General
William Lord envisioned cyber power as the first step towards fighting non-kinetic wars.35 The
U.S. military could feasibly use cyber weapons to scramble other countries’ banking systems and
possibly preempt armed conflict.36 Cyber weapons could therefore be used to replace guns and
bombs, making warfare less bloody.
Rid’s argument is an inaccurate explanation of why the U.S. military has not integrated
cyber power further. As explained above, cyber weapons do have the potential to cause

Yagil Levy, “The Tradeoff between Force and Casualties: Israel’s Wars in Gaza, 1987-2009,” Conflict
Management and Peace Science 27, no. 4 (2010): 388.
32
Chukwuma Osakwe, “Non-Lethal Weapons and Force-Casualty Aversion in 21st Century Warfare,” 6.
33
National Security Research, Inc., Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons and Equipment Review: A
Research Guide for Civil Law Enforcement and Corrections, no. 200516, published June 19, 2003, accessed
February 20, 2014, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/200516.pdf.
34
Richard L. Scott, Conflict Without Casualties, 36.
35
Sebastian Sprenger, “Air Force General Emphasizes Focus on Nonkinetic Warfare,” Federal Computer Week,
published September 6, 2007, accessed February 20, 2014, http://fcw.com/articles/2007/09/06/air-force-generalemphasizes-focus-on-nonkinetic-warfare.aspx.
36
Ibid.
31
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casualties via indirect means and can therefore be “violent” in a traditional sense. But this is
beside the point. Autonomous weapon systems are replacing human soldiers, thereby eroding
the symbolism of the human body in violence. Also, war is generally becoming less violent in
general, as evidenced by the U.S. military’s growing interest in NLWs. Cyber weapons are
therefore neither anomalous nor violent. Rather, they are one manifestation of a new paradigm
of warfare in which conflicts are increasingly automated and (eventually) non-kinetic in nature.

PROPORTIONALITY

Proportionality of response states that any incidental damage, destruction, or death that may be
caused to civilian populations as a result of a military operation should not exceed that mission’s
strategic utility.37 It is a staple of the law of armed conflict (LOAC), relating in particular to jus
ad bellum, the legal principles which help states decide whether to go to war, and jus in bello, or
states’ non-right to use unlimited force in war.38 These notions constitute a large part of just war
theory, which upholds a number of normative principles, including proportionality, in an attempt
to constrain states and protect innocent life in war.
Some scholars maintain that proportionality is impossible to determine in cyberspace.
They do so by extending Rid’s argument explained above. The effects of a cyber attack vary
depending on the target system.39 In most cases, the exact make-up of a target is not known
beforehand. This means that a retaliator can only determine proportionality on an ex post facto
basis when responding to a cyber attack.

Harold Hongju Koh, “International Law in Cyberspace,” U.S. Department of State, published September 19, 2012,
accessed October 19, 2013, http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm.
38
Jeffrey Carr, Inside Cyber Warfare (Sebastopol: O’Reilly Media, Inc. 2012), 31.
39
Paul A. Walker, “Rethinking Computer Network ‘Attack’: Implications for Law and U.S. Doctrine,” National
Security Law Brief 1, no. 1 (2011): 40.
37
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But the problem runs even deeper than that given the ongoing uncertainty regarding what
should constitute “damage” in cyberspace. The effects of most cyber attacks are digital and
therefore do not affect the “real” world. Some feel this means that cyber weapons cannot cause
actual damage. Furthermore, a cyber attack’s digital effects are neither immediately nor
publically visible to either the attacker or to any third parties.40 Only the victim knows the exact
effects of an attack. This ambiguity could incentivize victims to exaggerate the level of damage
in an attempt to justify a disproportionately high retaliatory act, thereby ignoring proportionality
and intentionally escalating a conflict.
The technologist argument maintains that proportionality in cyberspace is difficult
because cyber attacks are non-traditional operations whose effects are visible only to the victim
and depend on the target system, the details of which an attacker never fully knows. These
factors make both disproportionate responses and inadvertent escalation likely. If cyber weapons
cannot be used proportionately, the argument goes, they should not be used at all. Subsequently,
the U.S. military has allegedly refrained from integrating cyber power further.
Those who argue that the proportionality is difficult to uphold in cyberspace miss a larger
point: it is difficult to determine proportionality in any domain. Militaries concerned with
proportionality must strike a delicate balance between protecting innocence and wreaking
destruction, yet there is no standard legal framework by which they can do this.41 Instead
militaries must subjectively define important issues, such as who constitutes a “civilian” in IW,
when determining proportionality. Additionally, proportionality is an ambiguous principle.
What constitutes a “military advantage,” for example, is unclear given the variance of time and

40

Jason Andress and Steve Winterfeld, Cyber Warfare, 233.
Jonathan Wallace, “Proportionality and Responsibility,” The Ethical Spectacle, published August 2006, accessed
February 13, 2014, http://www.spectacle.org/0806/proportionality.html.
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space as they relate to military action. Together, these uncertain factors make proportionality
dependent on the strategic calculations of the U.S. military as a subjective actor.
An example is useful. Over the past few years, the United States’ has used unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) or “drones” to target and kill the personnel associated with Al Qa’ida and
other terrorist cells.42 Over the course of their deployment, U.S. drone attacks have caused
hundreds if not thousands of civilian casualties,43 which has raised questions of proportionality.
In response, Obama changed the rules of the game: he redefined “combatants” as all militaryage men within a combat zone.44 Obama manipulated the definition of “combatants” to get
around proportionality in pursuit of the United States’ security interests. This demonstrates that
the principle is fundamentally weak and can in fact be skewed to fit actors’ subjective goals.
Proportionality of response is difficult to uphold in any domain. The principle is plagued
by ambiguous components, which has allowed politicians to manipulate language in an attempt
to get around it. Proportionality has no objective grounding. Subsequently, just as the U.S.
military can apply proportionality subjectively at sea or on land, it can do so in cyberspace.

SIGNALING

Another factor that technologists use to explain why the U.S. military has not given more
operational autonomy to cyber power is the difficulty of signaling in cyberspace. Signaling is a
crucial part of war, for every action in combat communicates a message to an adversary. For

Tom Cohen, “When Can a Government Kill Its Own People?,” CNN Politics, published February 11, 2014,
accessed February 13, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/10/politics/us-killing-americans/.
43
“U.N. Rights Chief “Seriously Concerned” Over U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Echoed by Iran,” UN Watch,
published June 19, 2012, accessed February 13, 2014, http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2012/06/19/u-n-rightschief-seriously-concerned-over-u-s-drone-strikes-in-pakistan-echoed-by-iran/.
44
Joe Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” The New York
Times, published May 29, 2012, accessed February 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamasleadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all&.
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example, the use of military force articulates the threat that, unless its enemy stops, one will
continue to employ or escalate the violence. On the flip side, signaling is just as important for
conflict management. As noted by Thomas C. Schelling, classic game theory involves players
using signals to reveal their intentions.45 This helps players get to know one another, knowledge
which they can use to avoid escalating a conflict.46 But it is not that easy. For signaling to work
in any scenario, both actors must not only agree to what constitutes a signal, 47 but they must also
interpret each signal the same way. Signaling is therefore a delicate and context-dependent act.48
Cyberspace is cited as a remarkably difficult medium for signaling. It is an intrinsically
“noisy” environment,49 mainly because of the difficulty associated with attributing the source of
a cyber attack.50 This becomes especially tricky with “third party” actors, who may, if they
launch attacks of their own, complicate the process of signaling between two actors.51
Furthermore, even if it is clear that an enemy has attacked, some feel that signaling in
cyberspace is still difficult given the fact that a cyber signal can be interpreted more than one
way.52 As an example, the United States’ decision to form USCYBERCOM potentially conveys
multiple messages. The U.S. might be signaling its resolve to respond to cyber attacks, its fear
of being attacked, or its determination to use cyber capabilities offensively against others.53
Other states might feel compelled to launch preemptive cyber attacks against the U.S. in an

Thomas C. Schelling, “The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory,” The Journal of
Conflict Resolution 2, no. 3 (1958): 204.
46
Ibid.
47
Martin C. Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012), 62.
48
Mason Rice, Jonathan Butts, and Sujeet Shenoi, “A Signaling Framework to Deter Aggression in Cyberspace,”
International Journal of Critical Infrastructure 4 (2011): 61.
49
Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 114.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid., 133.
52
Stephen J. Cimbala, “Nuclear Crisis Management and ‘Cyberwar’: Phishing for Trouble?,” Strategic Studies
Quarterly 5, no. 1 (2011): 123.
53
Martin C. Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace, 66.
45

Bisson 15
attempt to prevent it from realizing its cyber ambitions. This would encourage the U.S. to
retaliate, possibly leading to a cyber war borne out of misunderstanding and poor signaling.
In cyberspace, it is difficult to signal one’s intentions. An actor such as the U.S. has a
difficult time determining whether it is signaling to the appropriate cyber actor and whether it is
sending the right message. Given these difficulties, the U.S. military under the technologist
argument lacks an incentive to broaden its use of cyber power.
However, the problems associated with signaling in cyberspace apply to all instances of
signaling. In an effort to issue a credible threat to an adversary and force it to back down from
conflict, actors in any domain may use “costly signals”—actions that raise the likelihood of
war.54 Examples of costly signals include mobilizing one’s troops or conducting a display of
force. Both reveal the defender’s resolve to respond to an attack.55
Using costly signals is dangerous. They are subjectively issued and interpreted and can
therefore be misinterpreted. For example, during the Cold War, the U.S. periodically increased
its defense spending to signal its commitment to deterring the spread of worldwide communism.
But the Soviet Union interpreted this merely as a reflection of the needs of the United States’
economy.56 Even in a binary international system, actors can misinterpret signals.
In today’s world, third parties can complicate signaling in all domains, including those
which involve nuclear weapons. For example, researchers at the Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis have warned about the possibility of “catalytic warfare,” in which third-party actors
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skew the signals of two major powers and start a nuclear war between them.57 The spoiling
influence of third party actors on crisis management therefore extends beyond cyberspace.
Signaling is difficult in any domain. Whenever two actors are trying to signal their
intentions to one another, signals can be misinterpreted or skewed by third parties, possibly
escalating a conflict into war. Acknowledging this, signaling is not a technological problem but
a political issue characteristic of most conflicts across all domains.

ATTRIBUTION

For the U.S. military to wage war, it must clearly define its enemy. But this is problematic in the
cyber realm. Much of this difficulty arises from the layered architecture of the attribution
problem. On the technical layer, analysts must identify that an attack has occurred and trace the
infected data back to an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a unique identifier which serves as a
destination code.58 Attributing a cyber attack therefore requires a fair amount of forensic work.
But even if an attack can be traced back to an IP address, the identity of an offender may
still be elusive. For instance, if admins are able to trace an attack back to the IP address of a
foreign government, this could mean that government employees are responsible, or that hackers
have hijacked the government’s network to confuse their victims.59 Clearly, attributing an attack
at the social level, or where a human user can be identified, is a complex process.60
The third and final layer of the attribution problem is the political. This level is partially
a consequence of the Internet’s decentralized nature. States could easily issue new laws and

Jacquelyn K. Davis, et al., “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies,
Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear ‘Wannabes,’” Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, published
February, 2009, accessed February 16, 2014, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf.
58
Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 145.
59
Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, 44.
60
Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 145.
57

Bisson 17
develop new capabilities to overcome the technical and social levels of the attribution problem if
they exercised sovereignty over separate cyberspaces. However, this is not the way the Internet
works. The Internet has no national boundaries. This means that, to meet international cyber
threats, states with varying interests must voluntarily choose to help one another. But states
understand cybersecurity differently. Additionally, if they are not victims themselves, it is
questionable to what extent outsiders would invest in helping others attribute an attack.
In the event of a cyber attack, the U.S. military needs to know who is responsible. Yet
the technical, social, and political layers of the attribution problem complicate this process. The
military does not have the resources to identify its attacker in the event of a serious cyber attack.
As a result, it is safer to subordinate cyber power to the other military branches and use cyber
weapons only as means of support.
Notwithstanding the arguments presented above, cyber attribution is not impossible.
Resolving the technical layer by tracing malicious code to a source is feasible, such as via the use
of whois searches. And even if they complicate attribution by launching attacks through a
foreign router, hackers and cyber criminals often have a particular style about their attacks. This
means that if a series of attacks exhibit similar properties, it might be the case that they were
developed and/or launched by the same attacker.61 Network analysts could then build a profile
of this attacker and share their findings with national and international partners.
The technical and social levels of the attribution problem are not impossible. What is
most difficult is the political layer. As no country presides over the web, the attribution problem
can only be solved via international cooperation. There are currently some promising
collaborative initiatives in the making. For instance, the International Cyber Security Protection
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Alliance (ICSPA) has recommended that financial institutions collectively shut down virtual
currencies, such as Bitcoin, by requiring all monetary transactions to proceed through auditable
channels.62 These measures would help eliminate a conduit for cybercrime that criminals have
used to extort payments for kidnapping and contract killing. 63 The public and private sectors
would have to work together to succeed, but both have incentives for doing so. Collaboration
would protect bank customers, which would enhance states’ economic competitiveness and
national and cyber security. The web connects public and private entities together. Therefore, to
counter threats in cyberspace, it makes sense that these actors must work together.
The issue of attribution in cyberspace is fundamentally a political problem.64 Cyber
attacks occur in a medium that unites the world, so international cooperation might be the best
means of making cyber attribution easier. This might explain why some are calling for a
‘Correlates of Cyber Warfare” project, which could document information regarding cyber
attacks, including time, target IP address, and method of attack, in an effort to facilitate
cooperation and information-sharing.65 Attribution is a problem in cyberspace, but this reflects a
lack of interstate cooperation, not the intrinsic nature of cyber weapons. As a result, attribution
does not convincingly explain why the U.S. has not granted cyber power more operational
autonomy.
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TECHNOLOGISM REFUTED

Some assert that the U.S. military has not given more operational independence to cyber
weapons because of the nature of cyber technology. The argument goes that, as a result of an
inability to inflict casualties, determine proportionality, signal one’s intentions, or attribute the
source of an attack, cyber weapons are too uncertain for further integration. But this is not so.
As I demonstrated above, most of these issues are political in nature, oftentimes reflecting a lack
of states’ willingness to cooperate. Moreover, some of the problems above affect a number of
kinetic weapons that play important roles in the American military establishment. Technology
therefore fails to explain why cyber weapons are subordinated by the U.S. military.

Strategic Culture
Technologists have failed to explain the current status of cyber power in the U.S. military
because they overstate the independent value of technology and undervalue the forces that enable
a large organization like the United States military to change. Indeed, Andrew W. Marshall best
captured these two observations when he wrote, “the main challenge in…[military change] is an
intellectual and not a technological one.”66
Technology plays a large role in motivating revolutions in military affairs (RMA),
changes in activity, effectiveness, and objectives as a result of new technological, systemic,
organizational, and/or operational developments.67 Each RMA is a process by which a military
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replaces its core competencies—a nation’s central warfighting capabilities—with newer ones.68
However, as quoted by Dima Adamsky, RMAs involve much more than technology:
Technology only sets the parameters of the possible and creates the potential for
military revolution. What indeed produces an actual innovation is the extent to
which militaries recognize and exploit the opportunities inherent in new war,
through organizational structures and deployment of force. It was how people
responded to technology that produced seismic shifts.69
Revolutions in military affairs force militaries to answer two questions: to what strategic
purposes can new technologies be applied, and how can they be applied to best fulfill those
purposes.70 This is no easy task. Military organizations must acknowledge the occurrence or
imminence of fundamental change in the social, political, economic, and technological
landscapes; from here, they must assemble new tactical, strategic, operational, and organizational
structures to accommodate these changes.71 Such a process involves several steps, including
military leaders—with the input of national decision-makers—validating that a revolution is
actually in progress, identifying a problem that will be solved by the exploitation of a new
technology, and actually exploiting said technology. As a result, revolutions in military affairs
occur over years if not decades, with stops and starts separating each stage from another.
Many conceive of the advent of cyber weapons as a revolution in military affairs. This is
particularly true with regards to Stuxnet. Paulo Shakarian concludes that Stuxnet has
revolutionized war by showing that a piece of software can damage real-world infrastructure.72
This attack has since raised questions about whether “force” should be redefined under LOAC,
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as well as how militaries should respond to cyber attacks on national critical infrastructure.
Similarly, Tim Hsia and Jared Sperli argue that Stuxnet has altered modern warfare by giving
militaries a weapon which allows them to infiltrate enemies’ computer networks with or without
Internet access, all without jeopardizing their soldiers’ lives.73 In this view, Stuxnet could alter
warfare in the long-term by digitalizing the battlefield and making conventional soldiers
unnecessary. However, the RMA of cyber power extends even beyond Stuxnet. Lt Col Mark
Williamson argues that the very existence of cyber weapons has splintered warfare into three
branches: war fought in the physical domains, in the cyber domain, and across both.74 As such,
he concludes the U.S. military needs a new framework of war, such as one mimicking Col John
Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop in which militaries constantly reorient their
worldviews to fulfill their objectives.75 Colin S. Gray agrees that the advent of internet
technology (IT) constitutes an RMA, but he feels that a lack of strategic cyber thought currently
limits the applicability of cyber power by the U.S. military. 76
As explained above, implementing an RMA, including the ongoing revolution in cyber
power, is not easy. The U.S. military must venture beyond the existence of new technologies
and figure out how to successfully exploit them. To do so, it must analyze its organizational
structure, determine and possibly re-sort its priorities, and create new institutions that will make
room for its use of new technologies. Much of this process is dependent on the military’s norms,
rules, behaviors, and historical experience that give rise to its strategic preferences, including in
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what ways it is willing to change. These inclinations, which are summed up by the term
“strategic culture,” affect the U.S. military’s conceptualization of when and how to use military
force,77 including how new technologies can be used strategically.
Strategic culture is important because it accounts for the failings of traditional structural
theoretical approaches. Neorealism, for example, emphasizes a future-oriented approach in
which rational state actors act according to calculations of expected utility. Given their potential
advantages, it would be rational for the U.S. armed forces to integrate cyber weapons further.
That this has not happened defies rationality. Fortunately, strategic culture accommodates this
behavior by acknowledging that strategic actors are socialized differently. Put another way,
elites from the United States, Russia, China, and Israel would not make identical strategic
choices if put in the exact same situation because they have different backgrounds and
experiences informing their decisions. These referent points and ideas constitute strategic
culture, which often comes into conflict with rationality.
It is important to note that the U.S. military is not a unitary strategic actor. On the
contrary, strategic culture interacts with the U.S. military on three levels: macro-environmental,
military organizational, and military sub-organizational. On the first level, the military’s
strategic choices are shaped by the United States’ geography, ethnicity, and history. 78 Other
factors include a linear understanding of time, an individualistic national self-conceptualization,
and complex power distance dimensions separating the elites from the public.79
At this level, the American military has a vision of U.S. culture as a liberal, democratic,
Protestant, and capitalistic culture composed of individualistic people who use analytical-logical
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reasoning to try to make sense of the world objectively, such as by developing new technologies.
The military treats the U.S. public as optimistic because it believes their country inspires them to
innovate. But the ways in which the American armed services model themselves off this vision
are problematic. For instance, they translate perceived American optimism into a military
culture of abundance, overwhelming force, and frontal assault with the belief that the United
States can subdue all enemies. This philosophy may in some instances prevent the development
of more nuanced military strategies. Furthermore, believing the American people are concerned
chiefly with the present, the U.S. military resists change and defers to battle-tested tactics which
may no longer cohere with the reality of war. This makes it difficult for the services to learn
quickly and make changes, including those that relate to new technologies. 80
The second level on which the U.S. military interacts with strategic culture is the
organizational, or military-wide. In this environment, the U.S. military has a vested interest in
upholding a strategic culture that extends to every corner of its organizational structure. 81
Towards this end, it has created a series of standard operating procedures (SOPs), regulations
outlining how its personnel should respond to a variety of situations.82 It is expected that each
military person will act according to these SOPs.83 Therefore, to institute change, the U.S.
military must reexamine its SOPs that up until now have kept its personnel safe and possibly
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institute new ones, which might make its service people feel threatened and resist.84 Every
process of change must navigate these complex organizational dynamics of the military.85
It is difficult for the U.S. military to change because, like any large organization,
bureaucratic constraints apply. The bureaucratic nature of the services has been well-researched.
For example, political economist Max Weber has asserted that the national army represents the
ultimate bureaucracy, embodying human civilization’s attempt to rationalize everything
including war.86 Additionally, Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp have noted that the
American military establishment functions like a bureaucracy in that it uses its influence to
mobilize support among members of Congress, veteran groups, and the press for funding.87
Like any bureaucracy, the military has its shortcomings. Captain Philip Kreck argues
that the military bureaucracy has two problems: fragmentation, where tasks are passed to
subordinates without designating recipients; and systems underutilization, where military
systems have been complicated by unnecessary procedures.88 These flaws are responsible for a
number of unfortunate incidents. For instance, medevac helicopters in Iraq are required to
strictly adhere to the Geneva Convention, which means they must display Red Cross markings
on their sides, fly unarmed, and enter into combat zones with armed air support.89 When there
are no escorts, the helicopters cannot fly; when they do, their markings present conspicuous
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targets for Al Qa’ida fighters. Instances such as these are the result of strict deference to
bureaucratic procedure. The U.S. military therefore functions like a bureaucracy to a fault.
That the U.S. military bureaucracy does not change when perhaps it should is an
important point. The military bureaucracy is not only hard to change; it is designed not to
change.90 This is because the strategic environment is constantly evolving,91 and no one can
predict when the next war might occur, against whom, under what conditions, and in what
arena.92 Subsequently, in peacetime, with no enemy immediately threatening the United States,
the American armed services lack operational tests, i.e. battlefield challenges, to structure their
strategic behavior and strategic culture.93 It would be irresponsible, even dangerous, to reconceptualize their doctrine in these circumstances, for any change would risk killing American
service people by abandoning battle-tested tactics and technology. 94 More than this, in times of
peace, the services compete with each other to project their interests onto the next war, which
defeats joint research efforts.95 For these and other reasons, the U.S. military always prepares to
fight the last war because it has the doctrine and organizational structures to do so.96 The
American armed services innovate only after the realities of war force them to adapt.
The third and final strategic cultural level that relates to the U.S. military is the military
sub-organizational, or that which relates to the strategic cultures of individual military branches,
such as the U.S. Army or Air Force. While they share the military’s cultural mindset overall, the
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services cultivate slight differences in thought. In response, unique strategic cultures of trust,
loyalty, dedication, espirit, and commitment take form.97
In the next section, it is on the military organizational level that I explore the current role
of cyber power in the U.S. military. I do so by analyzing the evolution of U.S. air power and
space power. These two cases share important parallels with cyber power. First, both air power
and space power have produced massive technological shifts within the U.S. military. To fully
exploit these new conceptualizations of force, the services researched issues such as
aerodynamics and jet propulsion, which culminated in the development of strategic bombers and
photoreconnaissance satellites. The same can be said with cyber power acknowledging the
explosion of ICTs over the past two decades. Second, air power and space power opened up
entire new domains to the military. Without air planes and satellites, the American armed
services could not have militarized air and space. Similarly, without the advent of computers, a
cyber domain would not even exist. Lastly, as with cyber power explained above, many
conceive of air power and space power as RMAs. James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol
argue that the development of air power was a revolution in military affairs insofar as the
military’s integration of airplanes produced a change across all forms of warfare.98 Meanwhile,
Colin S. Gray and James B. Sheldon assert that space power is not only an RMA and a militarytechnical revolution (MTR); it is also more fundamentally an “evolving physical reality” with
which all future wars must contend.99 In this regard, space power and air power are closely
related to cyber power in that all three have created technological booms in the United States,

97

Roger W. Barnett, Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
2009), 20.
98
James R. Fizsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, “Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quarterly (Spring
1994): 25.
99
Colin S. Gray and John B. Sheldon, “Space Power and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” Airpower Journal (Fall
1999): 31.

Bisson 27
constituted new warfighting domains, and revolutionized military affairs. As a result, the
histories of how air power and space power were adopted by the U.S. military are important to
understanding U.S. cyber power.

U.S. Air Power and Space Power
The histories of U.S. air power and space power offer insight into American cyber power. The
story of air power is one of how war led to military organization change. Prior to the First World
War, the U.S. military had no air force to speak of. This led the War Department to view
airplanes only as means of support and reconnaissance for the traditional services.100 The
military leadership also wanted to mediate the interservice rivalry of the Army and Navy and
allow them to use air power for their separate purposes.101 As a result, the U.S. military entered
into the First World War with airplanes bound to the services. In that conflict, some servicemen
began to conceive of air strategy with respect to bombing raids, but the war ended too quickly for
U.S. air power to evolve beyond tactical considerations. For the next two decades, some in the
military establishment tried to sway public interest towards the development of strategic
airpower. Some published books, whereas others conducted air bombing demonstrations off the
coast of the Virginia Capes.102 But the public remained firmly disengaged with war and enjoyed
the United States’ interwar policy of isolationism. However, the public gradually became
interested in air power via airplanes’ growing commercial applications in the 1930s, which led
the War Department to partially reorganize and give U.S. air forces some operational autonomy.
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This became even more pronounced following the bombings of Pearl Harbor. Capitalizing on
the public’s fear, the War Department created a temporary independent military branch for the
air services and, upon the United States’ entry into the Second World War, assigned them an
important mission: achieve air superiority in Western Europe. At first, the air forces suffered
some setbacks. But after they made a few adjustments, the war ultimately swung in their favor.
By 1944, the air forces had achieved air superiority, which allowed the Allies to cross the
English Channel and win the war. Three years later, the War Department created the United
States Air Force, a permanent independent military branch which effectively cemented its
recognition of the strategic utility of air power.
The story of space power is one of how the United States restrained the actions of its
military. At the end of the Second World War, impressed by the advancements of the Nazis in
rocket technology, the United States authorized Operation Paperclip, a covert mission in which
the military transported key German rocket scientists, documentation, and equipment to U.S.
research facilities.103 The U.S. military hoped to develop satellites that would enable it to
conduct reconnaissance of the Soviet Union.104 This aspiration deeply interested the services,
especially the Air Force, which wanted to lead the charge in missile defense systems.105
However, the War Department opposed the development of space weapons and instead
demanded that the services concentrate on enhancing existing military technology. The
interservice rivalry between the services further restrained the development of strategic space
power by preventing joint research projects into issues relevant to space exploration. After the
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Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first manmade satellite, some thought the military would
exercise a greater role in space. The public was fearful that the Soviet Union would launch
nuclear weapons from space, and the services still wanted funding for research into space
weapons. However, following this crisis, the nation’s leaders crafted a restrained response.
First, they centralized all space programs into a new agency that they hoped would more
efficiently mitigate interservice rivalry. Second, acknowledging the United States’ growing
dependence on satellite technology, they recognized that it was in the country’s interest to
demonstrate that it could explore space peacefully. They therefore created a separate civilian
space agency, which laid the foundations for the U.S. to cooperate with the Soviet Union on a
number of anti-weaponization space treaties. These agreements codified norms of peace and
cooperation in space, a legacy which has restrained the military’s use of space over the past 50
years. Today, the U.S. military still uses space primarily as a means of conducting
reconnaissance and as a force enhancer of the traditional armed services.
Given the brief histories above, I observe that four things characterize the development of
air and space power: the initial support status of new technologies, the role of popular interest in
motivating (or preventing) change, organizational reform following a national crisis, and the
centrality of external conflict. In the following pages, I discuss each component in detail. I
conclude this section by synthesizing these factors together into a model of military
technological integration for the U.S. military.

INITIAL SUPPORT STATUS

The first factor that unites the histories of air and space power is the initial use of new
technologies to support the traditional services. With respect to air power, the War Department
prior to the First World War asserted: “Military aircraft of all kinds [would] be employed under
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the direction of the commander of the forces to which they [were] assigned.” 106 Airplanes had
never been used in combat, so the War Department concluded they should primarily provide
support to the services.107 Additionally, the U.S. military leadership needed to mediate the
rivalry of the U.S. Army and Navy, who were competing for support of their proposed aviation
missions.108 It felt it could best preserve the cohesion of the services by allowing them to use
airplanes for their separate purposes. Towards this end, the War Department designated early air
power as means of only conducting reconnaissance for the services.109
Early space power was similarly constrained by the U.S. military and tied to the services.
A chief motivation for the American armed services’ decision to militarize space was the desire
to launch satellites into orbit and watch the activities of the USSR. 110 If it developed rocketry
capabilities before the United States did, it was assumed the Soviet Union would use this
technology to terrorize the West and exploit the United States’ lack of parallel capabilities. 111
Therefore, the U.S. military felt it needed to develop a photoreconnaissance satellite to prevent
this from happening. Some of the services, particularly the Air Force, wanted to go beyond
satellite technology and develop long-range missile capabilities. But these ideas did not receive
much support from the War Department. Indeed, in 1945, Dr. Vannevar Bush, the newly
appointed Chairman to the Joint Research Development Board (JRDB), refused to authorize a
joint service research effort into missile technology, 112 instead encouraging the services to focus
on improving military weapons that were already in existence.113 It was more important for the
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military to concentrate on enhancing its existing capabilities—those already employed by the
traditional services. However, like air power, this decision was also an attempt to mediate
intense interservice rivalry with regards to who would set the agenda for space’s militarization.
Acknowledging this, Bush confined space R&D to the development of more durable satellites.

PUBLIC INTEREST

A second factor that is evident in an analysis of the histories of U.S. air power and space power
is the importance of public interest. During the 1920s and 30s, Americans wanted nothing to do
with the military. The First World War still weighed heavily on everyone’s minds; the public
did not want to think of future wars. As a result, Americans were unmoved by several attempts
of U.S. airmen to try to elevate the importance of air power in their minds. These efforts
included publishing books on the future of air strategy, as well as conducting bombing
demonstrations off the Virginia Capes. Neither succeeded in piquing the public’s interest. In
fact, it was not until well into the 1930s when non-military applications of aviation technology,
including Charles Lindbergh’s flights and the advent of commercial airlines, first began to attract
people’s interest. The War Plans Division of the General Staff took notice and subsequently
created the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, a provisional division under which all
combat aircraft incorporating new duties such as bombardment were centralized. 114 This was the
first major concession the Army and Navy made to strategic air power. Arguably public interest
played a major part in motivating their decision to do so.
Public interest played an equally important role in influencing the U.S. military’s
adoption of space power. From 1970 to 1990, the Soviet Union periodically conducted tests on
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the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. These tests resulted in calls from within the
American armed services for more funding with regards to space weapon systems. 115 However,
the American people, as well as even some members of the military, did not feel that the Soviet
Union was as threatening as it once was.116 By this point in time, the United States had signed a
number of treaties with the Soviet Union prohibiting the weaponization of space. Two in
particular deserve mention. The first was the “Outer Space Treaty” (1967), where all signatories
agreed to not place installments, colonies, or especially weapons of mass destruction on the
Moon, other celestial bodies, or in orbit.117 The second was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(1972), under which the United States and the Soviet Union limited their ABM capabilities to
just two sites in rejection of nationwide missile defense systems.118 As a result of increased
U.S.-Soviet cooperation, the American people saw no urgency to increase military activity in
space. Other events, such as Vietnam, were attracting their attention.119 The American public
therefore resisted calls from within the U.S. military to support further funding for its space
programs, which caused the military’s space budget to plummet in the 1970s.
These instances illustrate three things. First, the military regards public interest as a
significant factor when integrating new technologies into its command structure. It would not
have sought public support for airplanes and the possibility of space weapons if it did not think it
could help them integrate these technologies. Second, public interest operates independent of the
services. In both cases, the U.S. military failed to manipulate the American people into
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supporting their aims because the public was concerned about other matters, such as avoiding
another world war and Vietnam. Lastly, because of an unsupportive public, the U.S. military
was unable to overcome the opposition preventing its further integration of new technologies.
Without public interest, the American armed services were unable to surmount these challenges.

A NATIONAL CRISIS

Perhaps the U.S. military actively seeks the public’s support because it knows how influential it
can be in times of a national crisis—the third similarity uniting the air power and space power
histories. On December 7, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Army attacked Pearl Harbor, killing
2,400 people and destroying an appreciable number of aircraft and naval vessels. Pearl Harbor
was ultimately responsible for the United States’ decision to enter into the Second World War.
More than that, however, it was the nation’s first direct encounter with the destructive effects of
strategic air power. The resultant fear and outrage by the American people in no small part
motivated President Roosevelt to appoint Henry H. Arnold as Commanding General, Army Air
Forces (AAF) in March of 1942.120 The War Department also reorganized itself over the next
few months, during which time it disbanded some of the other scattered air commands, increased
the representation of air servicemen, and allowed the AAF to formulate its own strategies.121
Through this national crisis and its aftermath, the War Department underwent organizational
change which ultimately gave the AAF greater operational autonomy.
With respect to space power, the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik, the world’s first ever
manmade satellite, also deeply affected the American people. Sputnik was a technological and
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psychological setback for the United States.122 Technologically, Sputnik improved the scientific
image of the Soviet Union, seeming to affirm its claims that it had superior scientific and
military technology.123 Psychologically, since the Soviet Union had been the first to make
tangible headway into space, Americans feared it would now exploit this military advantage by
launching nuclear strikes against the United States from space. In response to this fear, President
Eisenhower established the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and granted it
authority over all U.S. space projects.124 At the same time, the President realized the importance
of improving the United States’ image of using space for “peaceful” purposes. Subsequently,
Eisenhower signed the Space Act in 1958, setting up the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) as a separate civilian space agency pace. In doing so, he laid the
foundations for U.S.-Soviet cooperation on the goal of delegitimizing space’s weaponization.
Clearly, Sputnik and Pearl Harbor were different national crises. It is much different to
have a military base attacked and thousands of people killed than to have a satellite launched into
space. Perhaps this difference helps to explain why officials in the George W. Bush
administration invented the term “Space Pearl Harbor” to appeal to people’s sense of fear in an
attempt to gain support for missile defense research. Nevertheless, they played an important role
in the case studies of U.S air and space power. Pearl Harbor and Sputnik elevated the relevance
of airplanes and satellites, as well as created a sense of profound fear and vulnerability in the
American people. In both instances, the President responded by authorizing at least a partial
reorganization of the military, which in turn expanded the functions and strategic importance of
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new technologies. Therefore, given possible infighting as well as outlying institutional
constraints, a national crisis is sometimes necessary to unite the nation’s leaders and services
behind the idea of the military further integrating a new technology.

EXTERNAL CONFLICT

Finally, the centrality of external conflict unites the histories of air and space power.
Notwithstanding its rejection by the U.S. military, strategic air thought first began to take form
over the course of the First World War. A significant contribution to this movement was the
advent of trench warfare, which forced the allies to broaden their air tactics to include artillery
spotting and bombing raids. Then, some 20 years later, Germany, Japan, and Italy began a
massive build-up of their respective national armies, including their aviation capabilities.

These

developments deeply troubled the United States and convinced President Roosevelt, among
others, that strategic air power would serve a crucial function in the next war. As a result,
Roosevelt in 1939 signed the National Defense Act, providing the Air Corps with nearly 50,000
new recruits, 6,000 planes, and a $300 million budget to beef up its ranks.125 Roosevelt also
helped create the Army Air Forces (AAF), a temporary yet nonetheless independent branch of
the War Department.126 Following the attacks of Pearl Harbor, General Henry H. Arnold, the
Commanding General of the AAF, expanded the nation’s air capabilities, building a force of
80,000 aircraft and 2.4 million personnel.127 This newly formed armada received an important
mission: it needed to achieve air superiority in Western Europe to allow for an Allied cross-
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Channel invasion into France.128 At first, the USAAF met with mixed success. But with its
operational autonomy, the AAF was able to make four adjustments: first, it increased the size of
its forces; second, it adopted non-visual bombing techniques to allow for bombing raids in
unfavorable European weather; third, it created long-range fighter escorts, which allowed U.S.
bombers to penetrate deeper into enemy territory; and lastly, it allowed fighters, instead of
merely serving as escorts of American bombers, to engage the enemy. 129 The USAAF analyzed
its objectives and independently instituted changes. These adaptations ultimately helped produce
the war’s turnaround in favor of the Allies. After pounding German defenses, it was clear that
by March of 1944, the AAF owned the skies.130 This American air superiority allowed the Allies
to cross the English Channel on June 6, 1944, gain a foothold in Europe, and win the war.
With regards to the U.S. space program, the U.S. military wanted to enhance its space
power because it did not want to cede any military advantage to the Soviet Union. This desire
became especially pronounced after October 4, 1957 when the Soviet Union successfully
launched Sputnik 1 into orbit.131 Even so, the nation’s civilian leaders did not support a larger
military presence in space. The U.S. military needed satellites to observe the activities of the
USSR. But many policymakers felt it did not need orbital WMDs or satellite bombers.
Eisenhower hoped to avoid creating this reality.132 As a result, he created a special committee to
provide some recommendations. The Purcell Panel, as it was called, eventually concluded that
the United States’ space program needed to differentiate between “exploration” (a civilian
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function) and “control” (a military function).133 Purcell therefore helped to sponsor the idea of a
civilian agency leading peaceful operations in space separate from the military. More
significantly, however, the panel outright rejected the development of space weapons as “clumsy
and ineffective ways of doing a job,” supporting the idea that the Earth was the best domain in
which wars could be fought and won.134 In fact, if the United States were the first one to
weaponize space, other states might follow its lead, leading to an arms race.135 In his view, he
saw that it was in the interest of the U.S. military to not weaponize space. These findings of the
Purcell Panel have directed the U.S. military’s space program ever since, defeating various
attempts at space weaponization such as Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative and George W.
Bush’s plans for missile defense.
Airplanes and rocket technology arguably existed before the First World War and the
Cold War, respectively; if the U.S. military had wanted to use them to develop new weapons, it
could have. But it did not. Instead it conceived of air power and space power in response to
external threats, particularly as means that would allow it to overcome the challenges of ongoing
wars in which it was engaged. The utility of thinking about air power and space power rested on
the promise of turning the tide of these wars in the United States’ favor.

A MODEL FOR TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION

An analysis of how U.S. air power and space power emerged reveal four commonalities: the
initial support status of new technologies, the role of popular interest in motivating (or
preventing) change, organizational reform following a national crisis, and the centrality of
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external conflict. Together, they create a model that can help us understand the cultural reasons
for how the U.S. military chooses to integrate a new technology into its organizational structure
and, if so, how far.

U.S. Cyber Power
In this section, in order to examine how the histories of American air power and space power
influence our understanding of cyber power, I use my model of technological integration to
examine the U.S. military’s cyber policy. I observe, among other things, that the current status
of cyber power reflects the cases of air and space power. I then conclude by identifying an
important trend: as a result of the growing number of apparent applications of cyber weapons,
the unlikelihood of a cyber warfare convention, and the proliferation and decreasing costs needed
to develop a cyber weapon in today’s world, states and non-state actors alike have an increasing
incentive to use cyber weapons to attack the United States. Such an attack is the most likely way
for U.S. cyber power to change and receive greater operational autonomy.

APPLYING THE CULTURAL MODEL

As explained in the introduction, cyber power is primarily used for support at this time, which
fulfills the first criterion of my model. The mission of USCYBERCOM is to protect DoD
communication networks and to coordinate the use of cyber weapons with regards to fullspectrum military operations. In this sense, cyber power enhances the traditional services’
effectiveness and improves the DoD’s overall functionality. Network-centric operations have
revolutionized war in that they have made computers integral to the use of military force. To
successfully coordinate any use of military force, it is crucial that the military’s leaders be able to
communicate with one another and with commanders on the battlefield. In seeking to protect
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this capability, cyber power enables the strategic coordination of land, air, sea, and space power
in war and, by extension, augments the effectiveness of each service’s force contribution.
This particular conceptualization of cyber power is also reflected in some of the most
recent U.S. cybersecurity documents. For instance, in The International Strategy for
Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, the Obama
administration makes the following statement:
When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as
we would to any other threat to our country. All states possess an inherent right
to self-defense, and we recognize that certain hostile acts conducted through
cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments we have with our
military treaty partners. We reserve the right to use all necessary means—
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—as appropriate and consistent
with applicable international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our
partners, and our interests.136
This passage asserts that if actors engage in “hostile acts in cyberspace” against the U.S., the
President reserves the right to respond. However, beyond restating the United States’
commitment to defend its cyberspace, this document falls short of explaining what “certain
hostile acts” would cause the U.S. to contemplate a military response. It neglects to explain what
acts, targets, and effects would be necessary to justify force. Moreover, the document fails to
articulate an escalation ladder for when the U.S. can use “diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic” means in response to cyber attacks. There is no response framework, only the
President’s affirmation that the U.S. can respond in a variety of ways. This limits the U.S.
military’s ability to respond to cyber attacks with force. Meanwhile, ordinary cyber operations
fall under the mission of USCYBERCOM: they help safeguard DoD networks and
communication capabilities, as well as provide support to the traditional services.
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The DoD has also reaffirmed using cyber weapons for communication and support in a
report published last year. As a result of the growing cyber threat confronting the country, the
report asserts that the United States needs to protect its nuclear deterrent in the face of serious
cyber attacks.137 It makes this point because of survivability: just as traditional nuclear
deterrence incorporates this notion, so too should cyber policy in the event of a catastrophic
cyber attack.138 But the DoD is careful to emphasize that the U.S. military will respond to a
cyber attack with conventional or nuclear force only if attackers tamper with hardware that
systematically corrupts vital governmental networks, or if cyber weapons are part of a larger
military operation.139 Both of these scenarios support the assumption that cyber power is a
means of support. The DoD sees that cyber operations must be paired with either
economic/industrial exploitation or kinetic force to constitute military action or warrant military
reprisals. Cyber attacks do not by themselves constitute top-tier threats, a fact which
USCYBERCOM’s mission reflects. Cyber weapons are strategic only when they support the
traditional services.
As in the cases of air power and space power, public interest is another important factor
that shapes the U.S. military’s interaction with cyber power. According to a 2013 poll conducted
by SurveyMonkey in partnership with Bloomberg West, only 21 percent of Americans are
concerned most about national cybersecurity; more than half are chiefly worried by the prospect
of domestic terrorism, whereas a quarter are focused on either missile defense or the war on
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drugs.140 This might help to explain why despite its rhetoric, the U.S. military has not explored
the use of cyber weapons in greater depth. Just like war-weariness deterred the development of
strategic air power in the 1930s and Vietnam blocked the weaponization of space in the ‘60s and
‘70s, other threats are monopolizing most Americans’ worries and preventing a deeper
integration of U.S. cyber power by the U.S. military.
But the issue goes much deeper than that. Domestic terrorism, missile defense, and the
war on drugs all carry their own obstacles, but the American people arguably understand these
threats better than cybersecurity. After all, millions of Americans experience the reality of
counterterrorism on a daily basis whenever they encounter a Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) checkpoint. And while missile defense and the war on drugs might not be
as immediate, they conjure up images of familiar concepts, such as satellites conducting
reconnaissance of missile sites and law enforcement officials arresting drug traffickers. These
threats and their responses, if not already integrated into the backdrop of everyday life, are at
least conceivable without requiring too much imaginative power. The American people
understand both what is at stake and what can be done.
By contrast, many Americans do not come into contact with cybersecurity on a daily
basis and, as a result, do not understand the threat very well. For example, in its 2013 Small
Business Technology Survey, the National Small Business Association found that while 94
percent of small businesses are at least somewhat concerned about the prospect of a cyber attack,
at least a quarter of owners have little understanding of cybersecurity in general or how to protect
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their businesses’ online security. 141 Similarly, while a number of Americans are concerned about
the prospect of cyber attackers shutting down civilian critical infrastructure or infiltrating
national defense systems, 142 at least forty percent of Americans have never heard of Stuxnet, let
alone have any idea about the types of cybersecurity legislation that Congress is considering. 143
Most Americans are unaware of the major issues that pertain to cybersecurity.
Without a fundamental understanding of cybersecurity, the U.S. public is willing to let
others make policy decisions for them without vocalizing what interests they specifically want
defended. They understand cyber threats only in the context of the web and therefore feel
comfortable entrusting the military with their cybersecurity. In actuality however, the military’s
activities online account for only a small portion of its cyber activities.144 In not understanding
what is fully meant by the term “cyberspace,” the American people are disassociating from the
issue of cybersecurity and blindly entrusting others with their interests. This disengagement
extends beyond the military, too. A joint poll taken by Associated Press and the GfK Group
after the fall 2013 Target breach reveals that an overwhelming majority of Americans feel that it
is the responsibility of retailers to guarantee their cybersecurity.145 They want businesses to do
whatever it takes to protect their security online, even at the expense of privacy.146
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The instances above suggest that the U.S. public does not feel it needs to engage issues
related to cybersecurity. It believes other actors such as the American armed services and private
retailers have a greater responsibility to tackle cyber threats, so it feels that these actors can
simply act according to its interests. But because it does not fully understand cybersecurity, the
U.S. public cannot prescribe what information it wants these actors to protect or how.
Subsequently, the military and retailers must speculate what constitutes the public’s interest.
The U.S. military therefore works to protect the American people from the vantage point of its
own organizational strategic culture, or the belief that cyber power should be securitized. The
way to go about implementing such an interpretation may not necessarily coincide with the
public’s interest. But in the absence of an informed opinion with regard to how it wants to be
protected in cyberspace, the public cannot say or do much otherwise.
In not wanting to engage the cybersecurity debate, the U.S. public creates a problem for
the American military. As I noted earlier, public interest helped the military to overcome
obstacles that were blocking the emergence of strategic air and space power. Following Pearl
Harbor, the American people’s outrage gave rise to the reorganization of the War Department
and a reinvigorated AAF. Similarly, the public’s fear of nuclear attack after the launch of
Sputnik spurred the President to centralize the nation’s space program in ARPA. The public’s
response to national crises—the third component of my model—played an important role in
leading the U.S. military to further integrate air and space technologies.
The same cannot be said for cyber power, for there has yet to be a national crisis that
unites the American people behind the issue of cybersecurity. That is not to say there has not
been talk of such a crisis. In October 2012, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned
about the possibility of a “cyber Pearl Harbor.” This attack would be powerful enough to
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damage several civilian critical infrastructure at once, degrade military and communication
networks, and paralyze the nation with the shock of its physical destruction and abundant loss of
life.147 In order to avoid such a devastating assault on the United States, Panetta and others have
been trying to appeal to the public to support the development of new cyber weapons. Once it
acquires these new capabilities, the U.S. military could then more actively protect the United
States’ interests in cyberspace.
While there is some cause to be concerned about an attack on the scale of a “cyber Pearl
Harbor,” many computer network experts believe that the U.S. military has exaggerated the
cyber threat. Renowned American cryptographer and writer Bruce Schneier, for instance, notes
that there is indeed a cyber threat confronting the United States, but the words we use to describe
it have meaning. If the U.S. public accepts a characterization of the threat as “cyber war,” the
nation assumes a state of helplessness which demands the military take over for its cybersecurity;
however, if the term “cybercrime” is used instead, this makes cybersecurity an everyday function
of the judicial system.148 The term “cyber war” serves the interests of a few, including the
military, in that it gives it power and money to broaden its authority.149 But this influence sends
the wrong message and elevates the likelihood of starting a cyber arms race. In Schneier’s mind,
the United States needs peacetime cybersecurity. 150
Schneier is not the only observer who has criticized the American armed services for
exaggerating the cyber threat. Larry Clinton, President of the Internet Security Alliance, argues
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that the Chinese cyber threat is exaggerated insofar as it is not in the interest of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to use cyber attacks to destabilize the American economy when China
owns so much U.S. debt.151 Also, given the United States’ impressive cyber capabilities relative
to those of China, including its vast array of IT applications and R&D, it would appear that
cyberspace seems to further demarcate the strong from the weak states.152 In this view, Clinton
concludes that while terrorists and rogue states might want to destabilize the United States, these
actors do not have the technological capabilities to do so.153 This means that the real cyber threat
does not arise from malicious actors trying to take down the military but from those who steal
national and private intellectual property. 154 Some officials in the DoD have asserted as much:
at the 2012 Air Force Association cyber conference, many of the speakers agreed that Cyber
Pearl Harbor has already happened.155 The catastrophe has been threefold: global cybercrime is
now more profitable than the drug trade, the U.S. has lost its technological advantage as a result
of the proliferation of cyber capabilities, and many American intellectual property rights have
been stolen.156 Given this type of threat, what is needed is more cooperation between the federal
government and private industries—not a militarized cyber response based on fear.157
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Clearly, while former Secretary of Defense Panetta and other DoD officials have in the
past warned about the threat of a “cyber Pearl Harbor”—and continue to do so158—most
cybersecurity professionals and computer experts feel that the U.S. military is exaggerating this
scenario. This counter-movement based upon a moderate approach to cybersecurity poses a
serious challenge to the American armed services in that it openly questions the wisdom of
militarizing cyberspace too much. Schneier’s concern with the need to avoid a cyber arms race
parallels the Purcell Panel’s rejection of space weaponization for fear of sparking an arms race in
space. And without public support for the development of more sophisticated cyber weapons,
the U.S. military currently has little chance of overcoming such an obstacle and justifying a
deeper integration of cyber power. What could change this would be an attack on the scale of a
Cyber Pearl Harbor. However, officials in the military have been warning about such an event
since the 1990s. Such a devastating cyber event may never take place or, if it does, may not do
so for years to come. In the meantime, the prospect of the U.S. military using cyber power
beyond supporting the services appears bleak.
Finally, like air power and space power, external conflict has proven essential to the
evolution of cyber power. It was during the Cold War that scientists first conceived of linking
computers together into the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) as a way
of preserving military communication capabilities in the event of a nuclear attack. 159 This was
not a response to a Soviet advantage in cyber power relative to the United States. Such an
advantage did not exist. Rather, cyber power was meant to protect DoD communication
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channels and, in the event of war, the traditional services’ ability to respond. Cyber power has
therefore always functioned as a means of supporting the services in the context of war.
In addition to helping spark its conceptualization, war has played an important role in
shaping cyber power in practice. The U.S. military has used cyber weapons in war since the late1990s. Its first experiment with cyber power occurred during the Kosovo intervention. In 1998,
the United States hacked into the Serbian air defense systems in order to confuse Serbian air
traffic controllers.160 This attack enabled the U.S. military to better protect its bombers, thereby
increasing the effectiveness of NATO’s air campaign in the region. Even so, the American
armed services decided against launching an all-out cyber war against Serbia. It did so for two
reasons. First, military planners were concerned that an extended cyber campaign would reveal
too much about U.S. cyber capabilities. In their minds, a cyber war would give the Serbian
forces, as well as other enemies of the United States, an incentive to develop their own cyber
weapons and launch retaliatory strikes. This could permanently erase the U.S. military’s cyber
advantage.161 Second, the United States did not want to be convicted of war crimes. Had it used
malware to attack a few Serbian banks, the U.S. military could have frozen Serbia leader
Slobodan Milosevic’s accounts, which may have driven Milosevic to accept defeat. However,
the U.S. military refrained because it did not want to cause collateral damage and make
thousands of Serbian civilians suffer.162 The United States wanted to keep the moral high
ground, so it rejected cyber war and instead used cyber weapons infrequently to support its air
capabilities. Cyber war, in the opinion of the U.S. military, would invite retaliatory strikes and
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international condemnation. These costs did not justify any further use of U.S. cyber power in
that conflict.
Five years later, the United States invaded Iraq, and once again it drew upon its cyber
assets for support. In particular, the Bush administration ordered a cyber attack on mobile
phones, computers, and other communication devices used by terrorists to plan roadside
bombings.163 This attack enabled the National Security Agency (NSA) to feed false information
to the insurgents, many of whom were led into a trap and subsequently captured or killed.164
Clearly, the U.S. military valued cyber weapons for their ability to sow disinformation, deceive
the enemy, and overall manipulate an adversary’s perception of the battlefield. Acknowledging
this, it was likely this experience that persuaded the U.S. military today to assign its cyber forces
to protect DoD communication networks for fear of falling prey to the same kind of attacks.
However, the American armed services’ use of cyber weapons over the course of the Iraq
war echoes the Kosovo intervention almost exactly. In the months preceding the invasion, the
United States considered launching a cyber attack against Iraq that would freeze billions of
dollars of assets, including Iraq President Saddam Hussein’s cash flow; however, for fear of
causing collateral damage in the form of economic ruin and civilian suffering, the U.S.
eventually decided against it.165 Additionally, the U.S. military was hesitant to develop an
official policy on the use of cyber war techniques for fear of encouraging other actors to develop
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similar capabilities, which could then be used against it.166 As a result, the United States did not
exploit cyber assets to their full potential for fear of the incurring undesirable consequences.
Clearly, the U.S. military early on used cyber weapons to confuse its enemies and support
the traditional services. But as the examples of Kosovo and Iraq demonstrate, the United States
held back because it did not want to cause collateral damage or lose its technological advantage
in cyberspace. Any extensive use of these weapons was simply too costly. As a result, U.S.
cyber power received little operational autonomy through the 2000s.
An application of my model to U.S. cyber power reveals the following: first, the U.S.
military currently uses cyber weapons as means of support; second, the American people are
worried about other issues and do not fully understand the cybersecurity problem; third, no
destructive “Cyber Pearl Harbor” has occurred yet, and if it has, this means the cyber threat
demands something other than a militarized response; and fourth, the U.S. military has restrained
its use of cyber weapons in war for fear of causing collateral damage and inviting retaliatory
strikes. Together, these factors explain why the U.S. military has refrained from giving cyber
power more operational autonomy. It has done so because, from a strategic cultural standpoint,
it lacks the support, the impetus, and the necessary historical experience to do so.

THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE

Reflecting on the analysis above, the U.S. may want to integrate cyber power further. The
United States has always used cyber weapons as means of support in war, creating a
conceptualization of cyber power that cannot easily be changed. But this does not mean that
change is impossible. Rather it shifts the emphasis away from the internal dynamics of the U.S.
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military and moves it into the world of external threats. In this final section, I argue that, as a
result of states identifying useful applications of cyber weapons, the unlikelihood of a cyber
warfare convention, and the decreasing costs of cyber capabilities, actors have more and more
incentive to attack the United States using a cyber weapon. This event is the most likely way the
U.S. military would integrate cyber power further.
The first reason why actors have a greater incentive to attack the United States in
cyberspace is because actors are discovering tempting real-world situations in which they can
use cyber weapons. Schneier and computer experts may support the idea of de-emphasizing the
military’s engagement with cyberspace in an attempt to avoid a cyber arms race. But officials in
Washington do not agree. In a meeting this past February, the National Security Council
discussed the idea of using cyber attacks against President Bashar al-Assad’s command structure
in the ongoing Syrian civil war.167 Such an attack would have its advantages. In a humanitarian
crisis, the United States has no incentive to put forces on the ground; a strategic cyber attack
against Syria’s air strike capabilities, which Assad has used to bomb urban centers over the
course of the civil war, could serve a humanitarian purpose and spare U.S. soldiers’ lives.168
Also, as the attack would undermine Syrian military capabilities only, it would have little to no
chance of causing collateral damage. Even so, Obama has been hesitant to use cyber weapons in
Syria because of the potential long-term consequences. The United States might interpret a
cyber attack as de-escalatory, but other actors might see it as a legitimate means of force. 169
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Cyber weapons could therefore open up a new kind of warfare and actually increase the
frequency of conflict, not to mention lower the costs of committing an act of aggression in the
international system. Acknowledging this, the Obama administration, as well as the U.S.
military more generally, is still concerned about the prospect of starting a cyber arms race and
exposing the United States to retaliatory attacks. Whether the desire to do humanitarian good in
Syria justifies taking these risks remains to be seen.
Russia has also discovered real-world applications of cyber weapons. Over the past
seven years, Russia has strategically used cyber attacks in three separate instances of what are
now widely recognized as “cyber wars.” The first occurred in 2007 when an IP address linked to
an official working in the Putin administration flooded the websites of the Estonian president,
Parliament, and prime minister after the Estonian authorities relocated a statue of a WWII-era
Soviet-era soldier.170 Russia has denied any involvement in the attacks. A year later in Georgia,
as part of a military intervention into South Ossetia to protect “Russian compatriots,” Russia
launched a broad range of cyber attacks, bringing down multiple government and civilian
websites for extended periods of time. The interruptions ultimately forced the Georgian
government to temporarily relocate President Mikhail Saakashvili’s web site to a web hosting
service based in Atlanta in an attempt to deter further intrusions. 171 After Russia achieved its
objectives, it ceased its cyber attacks and allowed the Georgian websites to come back online.
Lastly, Russian IP addresses are linked with massive DDoS attacks that were launched against
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Ukraine this year, disabling the servers of the National Security and Defense Council as well as
downing the websites and even mobile devices of hundreds of Ukraine government officials.172
States are discovering real-world uses of cyber weapons. Irrespective of whether Obama
decides to use cyber weapons against Assad, the Syrian crisis reveals that nations such as the
United States are discovering ways in which they can use cyber weapons to their advantage. The
fact that they are even theorizing about cyber power means that cyber weapons are considered a
viable method of attack by the U.S. military. Furthermore, Russia’s “cyber wars” illustrate that
in certain situations, states will in fact use these weapons to their advantage. This means that
actors will continue to consider the use of or actually deploy cyber weapons in war. Meanwhile,
for those states that have not yet considered developing cyber capabilities of their own, they will
more than likely at some point encounter an adversary whose cyber forces will motivate them to
establish their own cyber commands. States care about cyber power, and all indications suggest
that they will do so even more as other states invest in cyber weapons. These observations
suggest that the world will see an increase in the number of “cyber states,” of which any one
could launch a cyber attack against the United States, which would encourage its military to
grant cyber power more operational autonomy.
Second, the unlikelihood of a convention on cyber warfare makes it more likely that an
actor might use a cyber weapon against the United States. This is because the perceptions of
other states reveal that they conceive of cyber power differently than the U.S. military. In
today’s world, states do not agree on what cybersecurity entails. While the United States and
other Western democracies feel that cybersecurity primarily involves protecting computer
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networks against theft and data breaches, Russia, China, and other states feel that cybersecurity
also involves information security, which in their minds entitles them to manage the content and
communication exchanged over social media platforms.173 Different actors view the issue of
cybersecurity differently, and each state has a vested interest in defending its own view of the
problem, thereby creating intense disagreement in the international system. Acknowledging this
dissension, it is unlikely that states will be able to arrive at some sort of consensus necessary to
create a convention on the use of cyber attacks any time soon, a lack of restriction which allows
states to use their cyber weapons however they want. Even separate from states’ differing
evaluations of cybersecurity, the fact that one type of cyber attack can be used against a diverse
set of potential targets, including government websites and critical infrastructure, makes the
consistent application of a single body of law in this regard all but impossible. 174 There are
simply too many variables. As a result, it is unlikely that any international agreements on cyber
war will take form in the near future. Subsequently, states and non-state actors will be able to
legitimately create cyber weapons that they could then use against the United States, which could
create a large enough reaction among the American people and national leadership to justify the
U.S. military giving greater operational autonomy to cyber weapons.
The third and final factor that could lead to a notable cyber attack against the United
States is the proliferation of technology and the decreasing costs of developing cyber weapons.
What is important here is the distinction between weapons on the scale of Stuxnet and those such
as DDoS attacks. The former requires extensive financial and programming experience, as well
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as insiders who have integral knowledge of the target system’s configuration.175 Admittedly, the
costs of developing an attack on the level of Stuxnet has decreased in recent years: whereas it
once cost around $100 million to develop, today it costs only $10,000.176 This obviously lowers
the entrance cost into the global cyber arena. However, these types of attacks are nonetheless
mainly sponsored by only the most sophisticated cyber states in today’s international system and,
in turn, used against other states.177
The same cannot be said for the vast majority of cyber weapons. These assets, such as
botnets which actors can use in DDoS attacks, are inexpensive, easier to develop, and
multifunctional.178 The technology needed to create these types of cyber weapons is
proliferating, and the costs of development are steadily decreasing. As a result, it is reasonable
to expect that the number of actors capable of producing and using cyber weapons will increase
exponentially over the next few years. These actors, which will include terrorist organizations,
organized cybercrime syndicates, and commercial institutions, will have interests different than
those of states. As non-state actors, they might find the costs of launching a cyber attack against
a target such as the United States more acceptable than another state might. Furthermore, while
a Stuxnet-level attack is devastating, so is an extended cyber campaign using more common
cyber weapons. The proliferation of cyber technology and the drop in costs of producing cyber
weapons therefore pose a threat to the United States because they empower actors in cyberspace,
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especially non-state entities, to launch sustained mid-level cyber campaigns against states that
could overtime prove devastating. If—or perhaps when—one or more of these actors directs
such a campaign against the United States, the damage overtime might be sufficient for the U.S.
military to justify granting greater operational autonomy to its cyber forces.
Together, the three factors explained above—the fact that states are discussing the use of
cyber weapons and finding real-world applications for them, the improbability of an international
convention on cyber warfare being created, and the proliferation and declining costs of cyber
technology—suggest that another state or a non-state entity could launch a cyber attack against
the United States. If a state launches a moderately sophisticated attack against the United States
or if a non-state actor engages in an ongoing cyber campaign against American government
agencies or financial institutions, the U.S. could very well interpret the attack as signifying the
emergence of a new type of warfare. In this case, the United States would then go on the
defensive and likely provide the military with ample resources to make its cyber forces more
autonomous. This would initiate the process of the American armed services integrating cyber
power further into their collective organizational structure.
The bombings of Pearl Harbor and the subsequent participation of the United States in
the Second World War accelerated the U.S. military’s integration of aviation technology,
allowing air power to evolve into an independent service of its own right. By contrast, in the
absence of a “hot war,” the military has integrated space power to only a certain extent, and the
process has been much slower. As I argue above, a cyber attack against the United States is the
most likely way American cyber power would change in a manner that would mimic the
emergence of strategic air power. Should such an attack not occur, it is more likely that the
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military’s adoption of cyber power will be a much slower, more deliberate process that at least
partially reflects the development of U.S. space power.

Conclusion
In this article, I have demonstrated how cultural factors inhibit the U.S. military’s integration of
cyber power beyond assigning them to protect defense networks and support the traditional
services. Towards this end, I challenged the conventional wisdom that the associated technology
makes cyber weapons non-useful and not even “weapons.” I have shown that technology is not
non-contextual. History, including the process by which large organizations such as the U.S.
military make changes, is significant. With regards to RMAs, a technology must not only exist.
The U.S. military must also create procedures, doctrines, and other organizational features that
allow it to shape a technology according to its interests.
The case studies of U.S. air power and space power reveal four factors as a way of
understanding how the U.S. military integrates new technology. First, technologies are initially
tied to the other services. Second, public interest plays an important role in supporting the U.S.
military should obstacles arise. Third, a national crisis can and often does lead to military
organizational change. And lastly, as a result of these events, the U.S. military underwent some
organizational changes which allowed both air power and space power to evolve in the context
of external conflict. These four cultural factors played an integral role in shaping the histories of
air and space power and help to explain the current status of U.S. cyber power. While the U.S.
military might have an incentive to integrate them further, it does not have the public support to
do so. The American people are concerned with other issues, such as domestic terrorism.
Furthermore, they do not fully understand the cyber problem and are willing to entrust other
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actors to make decisions for them, which negates any impact they might have on encouraging the
American armed services to grant cyber power greater operational autonomy. At the same time,
the U.S. public listens to a few prominent computer experts, who disagree with the U.S.
military’s warnings that a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” is around the corner. They note that such a
crisis has not occurred yet, that the military’s efforts could backfire and lead to a cyber arms
race, and that a more measured response to cybersecurity, including government-industry
partnerships, is preferable at this time. U.S. cyber power has also evolved in the context of war,
particularly in Kosovo and Iraq. But in each of these cases, the United States has shown restraint
for fear of causing collateral damage and inviting retaliatory strikes. Together, these cultural
factors explain why the U.S. military has not further integrated cyber power.
Then again, this might change. External stimuli in the form of a cyber national crisis, not
necessarily on the scale of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor,” could occur and cause the U.S. military to
grant its cyber forces greater operational autonomy. Three trends make this scenario possible:
actors such as the United States and Russia are still discussing and discovering real-world
applications for the use of cyber weapons, the international system is unlikely to produce a
convention on cyber warfare, and cyber technologies are proliferating and decreasing in cost.
These three factors increase the likelihood of a cyber attack against the U.S. Regardless of the
attacker’s motivation, should such an attack occur, the U.S. would likely acknowledge the
emergence of a new form of warfare, go on the defensive, and support the U.S. military in
integrating cyber power deeper into its organizational structure.
Going forward, the cultural model I proposed in this paper may be able to explain the
statuses of other emergent conceptualizations of military force. One of these is robotics power,
which includes military drones. Drones are currently used to support the missions of the
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traditional services. They have evolved in the context of irregular warfare, but because of the
collateral damage they have caused in recent years, the American public is hesitant to support the
U.S. military’s further integration of the technology. This could change as the phenomenon of
modern warfare, marked by the United States’ growing aversion to casualties, continues to take
form. Together, cyber weapons and robotics promise to satisfy states’ desire to avoid putting
their soldiers’ lives in jeopardy, so it is reasonable to expect that both will be granted more
operational autonomy by the U.S. military at some point. Once integrated, both will increasingly
reshape war into battles fought by unmanned, autonomous weapons. This will require scholars
and policymakers alike to embrace a new notion of what constitutes violence in the future.
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